B-event statement
| Encyclopedia of Terminology for CA and IL: B-event statement | |
|---|---|
| Author(s): | Salla Kurhila (University of Helsinki, Finland) (https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0426-3660) & Daniel Radice (University of Helsinki, Finland) |
| To cite: | Kurhila, Salla, & Radice, Daniel. (2023). B-event statement. In Alexandra Gubina, Elliott M. Hoey & Chase Wesley Raymond (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Terminology for Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics. International Society for Conversation Analysis (ISCA). DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/WFJ68 |
In the original definition given by Labov and Fanshel (1977), a B-event is one which is known by the recipient (B) but not by the speaker (A). A B-event statement is a declarative utterance which both participants orient to as concerning such events. According to Labov and Fanshel, participants normally orient to B-event statements as requests for confirmation. Later research by Pomerantz (1980) has shown that participants may also orient to B-event statements as requests for information. The following example illustrates a B-event statement treated as a request for confirmation:
(Heritage 1984: 309) 01 Jen: -> =[Okay then I w]’z asking=’er en she says yer 02 -> working tomorrow ez well. 03 Ida: Yes I’m s’pose to be tihmorrow yes, 04 Jen: O[h:::. 05 Pat: [Yeh,
As it deals with the recipient’s work timetable, Jen’s declarative utterance in lines 1–2 is likely to relate to a B-event. Ida orients to this as a request for confirmation, confirming it as true in line 3. The fact that Jen responds with the change-of-state token “oh” indicates that her statement was indeed a request for confirmation rather than, for example, an informing.
Later research (e.g., Stivers, et al., 2011) has increasingly handled B-events within the broader concept of epistemics. A participant’s higher epistemic status within a domain of information may be based on their better knowledge, as in the original B-event definition, but may also relate to their rights and responsibilities to know and make assertions about the domain. A participant making a B-event statement, therefore, positions themself as less knowledgeable than the recipient, and this asymmetry is marked using the abbreviations K+ and K- (Heritage 2012). The K+ participant is also referred to as having epistemic primacy (Stivers, et al. 2011).
The domains of information where people are generally assumed to have epistemic primacy include their thoughts, feelings, experiences, hopes and expectations (Stivers, et al. 2011) as well as their relatives, friends, pets, jobs and hobbies (Heritage & Raymond 2005). In terms of the distinction made by Pomerantz (1980), people’s knowledge in these domains is normally Type 1 knowledge, which is firsthand, rather than Type 2 knowledge, which is derivative knowledge known only by hearsay or other indirect means.
Because B-event statements are based on people’s generally valid assumptions about epistemic primacy in different domains, misunderstandings can easily occur. In the following example, A’s informing is mistakenly interpreted by B as a B-event statement:
(Heritage 2013: 387) 01 A: So you’re going to Ellen on Monday. 02 B: Tuesday. 03 A: -> No she’s got a problem with Tuesday. She told me. 04 B: Oh.
B-event statements are closely related to formulations and candidate understandings, as all three normally seek confirmation from the recipient as to whether the speaker has the right interpretation or understanding of a matter. In contrast to formulations and candidate understandings, however, B-event statements are not defined in terms of their relation to preceding talk: a conversation could start, for example, with a B-event statement.
The use and functions of B-event statements have been examined in a variety of contexts. Weatherall (2015) shows how B-event statements can serve in dispute resolution to recognise a person's affective stance without endorsing its legitimacy. Cerović (2021), meanwhile, has examined the realisation of B-event statements as accusations in police interviews with criminal suspects.
Additional Related Entries:
Cited References:
Cerović, M. (2022). B-event statements as vehicles for two interactional practices in police interactions with suspects/witnesses. Discourse Studies, 24(1), 3–23.
Heritage, J. (1984). A change-of-state token and aspects of its sequential placement. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis (pp. 299–345). Cambridge University Press.
Heritage, J., & Raymond, G. (2005). The terms of agreement: Indexing epistemic authority and subordination in talk-in-interaction. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68(1), 15–38.
Heritage, J. (2013). Epistemics in Conversation. In Sidnell, J., & Stivers, T. The Handbook of conversation Analysis (pp. 370–394). Wiley-Blackwell.
Labov, W., & Fanshel, D. (1977). Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as Conversation. Academic Press.
Pomerantz, A. M. (1980). Telling my side: ‘Limited access’ as a ‘fishing device’. Sociological Inquiry, 50, 186–198.
Stivers, T., Mondada, L., & Steensig, J. (2011). The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation. Cambridge University Press.
Weatherall, A. (2015). But whose side are you on? Doing being independent in telephone-mediated dispute resolution. In Chevalier, F. H., & Moore, J. (Eds.). Producing and Managing Restricted Activities: Avoidance and Withholding in Institutional Interaction. John Benjamins.
Additional References:
Englert, C. (2010). Questions and responses in Dutch conversations. Journal of Pragmatics 42, 2666–2684.
Heritage, J. (2012a). The epistemic engine: Sequence organization and territories of knowledge. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 45, 25–50.
Heritage, J. (2012b). Epistemics in action: Action formation and territories of knowledge. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 45, 1–25.
