Tilley1980
| Tilley1980 | |
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| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Tilley1980 |
| Author(s) | Nicholas Tilley |
| Title | Popper, Positivism and Ethnomethodology |
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| Tag(s) | EMCA, positivism, Karl Popper |
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| Year | 1980 |
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| Journal | British Journal of Sociology |
| Volume | 31 |
| Number | 1 |
| Pages | 28–45 |
| URL | Link |
| DOI | 10.2307/590061 |
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Abstract
Recent discussions in the philosophy of the social sciences exhibit a remarkable agreement about what has become one of the most urgent problems for sociological methodology. The situation may be summarized thus: ethnomethodological developments in interpretative sociology have shown that there can be no firm and certain basis on which to ground truth claims for our propositions. The conclusion drawn from this is that the traditional aspirations of conventional sociology - to be objective and scientific - cannot be attained. However, the programme of work promised by those who have developed ethnomethodology as a critique of 'conventional sociology' itself contains certain difficulties. Thus, the problem addressed by those writing in the philosophy of social science is this: given the contradictions in sociology as traditionally practiced, and given the problems in the programme offered by those largely responsible for discrediting it, whither sociology now? The purpose of my paper is to show that the question may be unnecessary. This is not so much because interpretative sociologists are mistaken in their understanding of the conditions in which research is undertaken, but rather because the positivist epistemological assumptions taken to be necessary for an objective scientific sociology, are not required for this and indeed are erroneous. I shall argue specifically that a Popperian account of (objective) science is wholly compatible with the understanding contemporary interpretative sociologists have of the research context, and indeed that there are striking similarities between this and Popper's ideas, most especially those developed in recent years. Thus, I shall go on to suggest that, by adopting a Popperian epistemology we may thereby recognize the validity of the fundamentals of the ethnomethodological position without being forced to abandon the effort to be objective and scientific; we may also sidestep the particular difficulties into which the ethnomethodologists have been led. In this paper I shall not, of course, be concerned to defend Popper's philosophy of science against all the many criticisms which have been made of it. Nevertheless, in showing that Popper's work is compatible with, and in many ways comparable to, the substantive element of ethnomethodological sociology, I shall indicate that, in this respect at any rate, it has been widely misunderstood and misrepresented in recent discussions. I shall begin by outlining very briefly the way the current problem has emerged, giving a short summary of the ethnomethodological critique of positivist sociology and an indication of why ethnomethodology itself has been found to be an unacceptable alternative. I shall then proceed to the main substance of my paper - to the presentation of a Popperian resolution of the problem.
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