Deontic authority
| Encyclopedia of Terminology for CA and IL: Deontic authority | |
|---|---|
| Author(s): | Melisa Stevanovic (Tampere University, Finland) (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0429-1672) |
| To cite: | Stevanovic, Melisa. (2023). Deontic authority. In Alexandra Gubina, Elliott M. Hoey & Chase Wesley Raymond (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Terminology for Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics. International Society for Conversation Analysis (ISCA). DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/WZU3C |
Deontic authority refers to the capacity of a person to determine action. It is about defining what “ought-to-be”—what will be forbidden, obligatory, or permissible (the ancient Greek word deon, “that which is binding”; Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012). Deontic authority involves both the right of a person to expect another person’s compliance and their right to launch autonomous action with consequences for another person.
As a moral and political notion, “authority” involves an exercise of power that is regarded as legitimate by those subject to it (Lukes 1978: 649; Weber 1978; Wild 1974; Zelditch & Walker 1984). Bochenski (1974) described authority as a triadic relation consisting of “the bearer” of authority (someone, x, who is said to have authority), “the subject” of authority (someone, y, for whom the bearer is an authority), and “the field” (class of entities, ɤ, in which x has authority for y). Authority is thus not primarily about someone claiming authority, but it is about others accepting someone as an authority in a specific domain. A widespread view involves a distinction between a person being an authority either in a certain field of knowledge or occupying a position associated with rights to set rules for action (Bochenski 1974; Lukes 1978). While the notion of epistemic authority (e.g., Heritage 2013; Heritage & Raymond 2005) encompasses the former, the notion of deontic authority encompasses the latter.
Participants’ orientations to deontic authority can be observed in the ways in which their turns are designed and linked to their co-participants’ turns of talk. Essential to achieving deontic authority in interaction is the notion of recipient design (Sacks, et al. 1974) whereby the action that a turn at talk performs makes relevant “a particular identity or membership category of both the recipient and, reciprocally, the speaker” (Clifton 2018: 336). In some settings, such as medical consultation (Boyd 1998; Heritage 2005; Peräkylä 1998, 2002), classroom (Macbeth 1991), or support work (Antaki & Webb 2020), deontic authority is closely related to institutional power. On other occasions, deontic authority is derived from awareness of social obligations in a public domain (Ran & Huang 2019).
Deontic authority becomes relevant in two domains of action. First, there is the domain of spoken and expressive contributions in the interaction then and there (“proximal deontics”). Someone’s authority in this domain becomes visible, for example, when people, in various institutional interactions, comply with the asymmetrical turn-taking systems (e.g., teacher and pupils in a classroom) that endow them with quite different amounts of freedom in terms of their talk (Kendall 1993; Macbeth 1991; Mehan 1979) or, for other reasons, allow one participant of the encounter (e.g., the chairperson of an organizational meeting) to exert control over the agenda for the emerging interaction (Angouri & Marra 2011; Boden 1994; McKinlay & McVittie 2006; Pomerantz & Denvir 2007; Ruusuvuori 2000;). Second, there is the domain of actions to be performed sometime later (“distal deontics”). When participants discuss their future actions, their orientations to deontic authority can be seen, for example, in people’s overt expressions of subordination (Griswold 2007) and their displays commitment to actions that have only been hinted at (Stevanovic 2011).
Deontic authority has been associated with the class of “directive-commissive actions” (Couper-Kuhlen 2014), including requests, proposals, and suggestions (directives), on the one hand, and offers, invitations, and promises (commissives), on the other. Still, deontic authority cannot be straightforwardly linked to any specific linguistic resources, such as imperatives or deontic modal verbs (e.g., ought, must, should, can, may and could). Although these resources are commonly used to issue orders and commands (Goodwin 1990: 83; Craven & Potter 2010: 442) and to establish what is obligatory, permissible, or forbidden (Curl & Drew 2008; Sterponi 2003; Zinken & Ogiermann 2011), the mere presence of these resources is not enough to make the utterance count as a claim of deontic authority, but participants’ own orientations also need to be considered.
The notion of entitlement overlaps with that of authority. A person may be entitled to knowledge (e.g., Gill 1998), which is a matter of epistemic authority. Entitlement with reference to action (Craven & Potter 2010; Curl & Drew 2008; Heinemann 2006) then again is a matter of deontic authority. As far as a person’s deontic authority is publicly displayed in their conduct (see also deontic stance), the notion of “entitlement to action” may be used interchangeably with that of deontic authority. However, deontic authority is not only about public conduct but about others orienting to a person as authoritative (see also deontic status). This has specific conceptual consequences. For example, in the context of requests, a person’s degree of entitlement has been argued to be inversely related to the amount of the contingencies surrounding the recipient’s compliance with the request (Curl & Drew 2008). Deontic authority, however, does not necessarily need to be curtailed by such a relation. A person with an extremely high level of deontic authority may be able to except compliance independent of how much trouble that compliance is associated with.
Sometimes deontic authority becomes relevant for the participants, not as a possession they might want to claim, but rather as something they seek to disclaim. Such attempts at “deontic symmetry” (Magnusson 2021; Stevanovic 2013; Thompson, et al. 2021; Weiste, et al. 2020) characterize, for example, joint decision making and proposals for joint activities in various contexts.
Additional Related Entries:
Cited References:
Angouri, J. & Marra, M. (2011). Corporate meetings as genre: A study of the role of the chair in corporate meeting talk. Text & Talk, 30(6), 615–636.
Antaki, C., & Webb, J. (2019). When the larger objective matters more: Support workers’ epistemic and deontic authority over adult service‐users. Sociology of Health & Illness, 41(8), 1549–1567.
Bochenski, J. M. (1974). An analysis of authority. In F. J. Adelman (Ed.), Authority (pp. 56–85). Martinus Nijhoff.
Boden, D. (1994). The Business of Talk: Organizations in Action. Polity Press.
Boyd, E. (1998). Bureaucratic authority in the “company of equals:” The interactional management of medical peer review. American Sociological Review, 63(2), 200–224.
Clifton, J., Van De Mieroop, D., Sehgal, P. & Aneet (2018). The multimodal enactment of deontic and epistemic authority in Indian meetings. Pragmatics, 28(3), 333–360.
Couper-Kuhlen, E. (2014). What does grammar tell us about action?. Pragmatics, 24(3), 623–647.
Craven, A. & Potter, J. (2010). Directives: Entitlement and contingency in action. Discourse Studies, 12(4), 419–442.
Curl, T. S. & Drew, P. (2008). Contingency and action: A comparison of two forms of requesting. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 41(2), 129–153.
Goodwin, M. H. (1980). Directive-response speech sequences in girls’ and boys’ task activities. In S. McConnell-Ginet, R. Borker, & N. Furman (Eds.), Women and Language in Literature and Society (pp. 157–173). Praeger.
Griswold, O. (2007). Achieving authority: Discursive practices in Russian girls’ pretend play. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 40(4), 291–319.
Heinemann, T. (2006). ‘Will you or can’t you?’: Displaying entitlement in interrogative requests. Journal of Pragmatics, 38(7), 1081–1104.
Heritage, J. (2005). Revisiting authority in physician-patient interaction. In J. F. Duchan & D. Kovarsky (Eds.), Diagnosis as Cultural Practice (pp. 83–102). Mouton de Gruyter.
Heritage, J. (2013). Epistemics in conversation. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.), The Handbook of Conversation Analysis (pp. 370–394). Wiley-Blackwell.
Heritage, J., & Raymond, G. (2005). The terms of agreement: Indexing epistemic authority and subordination in talk-in-interaction. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68(1), 15–38.
Kendall, S. (1993). Do health visitors promote client participation? An analysis of the health visitor-client interaction. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 2(2), 103–109.
Lukes, S. (1978). Power and authority. In T. Bottomore & R. Nisbet (Eds.), A History of Sociological Analysis (pp. 633–676). Heinemann.
Macbeth, D. (1991). Teacher authority as practical action. Linguistics & Education, 3(4), 281–313.
Magnusson, S. (2021). Establishing jointness in proximal multiparty decision-making: The case of collaborative writing. Journal of Pragmatics, 181, 32–48.
McKinlay, A. & McVittie, C. (2006). Using topic control to avoid the gainsaying of troublesome evaluations. Discourse Studies, 8(6), 797–815.
Mehan, H. (1979). Learning Lessons: Social Organisation on the Classroom. Harvard University Press.
Peräkylä, A. (1998). Authority and accountability: The delivery of diagnosis in primary health care. Social Psychology Quarterly, 61(4), 301–320.
Peräkylä, A. (2002). Agency and authority: Extended responses to diagnostic statements in primary care encounters. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 35(2), 219–247.
Pomerantz, A. & Denvir, P. (2007). Enacting the institutional role of chairperson in upper management meetings: The interactional realization of provisional authority. In F. Cooren (Ed.), Interacting and Organizing: Analyses of a Management Meeting (pp. 31–51). Lawrence Erlbaum.
Ran, Y., & Huang, X. (2019). Deontic authority in intervention discourse: Insights from bystander intervention. Discourse Studies, 21(5), 540–560.
Ruusuvuori, J. (2000). Control in the medical consultation: Practices of giving and receiving the reason for the visit in primary care consultations. Acta Electronica Universitatis Tamperensis 16. University of Tampere, Finland.
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn taking for conversation. Language, 50(4), 696–735.
Sterponi, L. A. (2003). Account episodes in family discourse: The making of morality in everyday interaction. Discourse Studies 5(1): 79–100.
Stevanovic, M. (2011). Participants’ deontic rights and action formation: The case of declarative requests for action. Interaction & Linguistic Structures 52.
Stevanovic, M., & Peräkylä, A. (2012). Deontic authority in interaction: The right to announce, propose, and decide. Research on Language & Social Interaction, 45(3), 297–321.
Stevanovic, M. (2013). Constructing a proposal as a thought: a way to manage problems in the initiation of joint decision-making in Finnish workplace interaction. Pragmatics, 23(3), 519–544.
Thompson, S. A., Fox, B. A., & Raymond, C. W. (2021). The grammar of proposals for joint activities. Interactional Linguistics, 1(1), 123–151.
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society (vols. 1 & 2) (edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich). University of California Press.
Weiste, E., Stevanovic, M., & Lindholm, C. (2020). Introduction: Social inclusion as an interactional phenomenon. In. In C. Lindholm, M. Stevanovic, & E. Weiste (Eds.), Joint Decision Making in Mental Health: An Interactional Approach (pp. 1–41). Palgrave Macmillan.
Wild, J. (1974). Authority. In F. J. Adelman (Ed.), Authority (pp. 7-23). Martinus Nijhoff.
Zelditch, M. & Walker, H. A. (1984). Legitimacy and the stability of authority. In E. J. Lawler (Ed.), Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research (pp. 1–27). JAI Press.
Zinken, J. & Ogiermann, E. (2011). How to propose an action as objectively necessary: The case of Polish Trzeba x (“One needs to x”). Research on Language and Social Interaction, 44(3), 263–287.
Additional References:
