Difference between revisions of "Gibson2016"
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|BibType=ARTICLE | |BibType=ARTICLE | ||
|Author(s)=David R. Gibson; | |Author(s)=David R. Gibson; | ||
| − | |Title=Ignorance at | + | |Title=Ignorance at risk: interaction at the epistemic boundary of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme |
| − | |Tag(s)=EMCA; Epistemics; Deception; Repair; Secret; | + | |Tag(s)=EMCA; Epistemics; Deception; Repair; Secret; |
|Key=Gibson2016 | |Key=Gibson2016 | ||
|Year=2016 | |Year=2016 | ||
| + | |Language=English | ||
|Journal=Qualitative Sociology | |Journal=Qualitative Sociology | ||
|Volume=39 | |Volume=39 | ||
|Number=3 | |Number=3 | ||
| − | |Pages= | + | |Pages=221–246 |
|URL=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11133-016-9336-5 | |URL=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11133-016-9336-5 | ||
|DOI=10.1007/s11133-016-9336-5 | |DOI=10.1007/s11133-016-9336-5 | ||
|Abstract=Most long-lived organizational deceptions require the cooperation of outsiders who are close enough to the deception to suspect it, yet deliberately limit their knowledge so as to maintain plausible deniability. The interaction of such “proximate outsiders” with insiders—those who are fully “in the know”—can be a delicate affair, yet its careful management is essential to the survival of the deception. I analyze a phone conversation between Ponzi schemer Bernard Madoff and executives at Fairfield Greenwich, the investment firm that funneled him the most money, in which they discussed an impending SEC examination. First I examine Madoff’s attempts to cajole the executives into affirming (to Madoff and eventually to the SEC) that their hands-off approach to his operation was unremarkable. Next I consider two instances in which Madoff floundered in his explanations, repeatedly aborting and restarting sentences as he attempted to explain the inexplicable and reconcile the irreconcilable. Finally, I analyze Madoff’s handling of two of the executives’ more intrusive questions, and the part that each side played in the resulting non-answer. The three parts of the analysis illustrate what I argue are recurring and generalizable challenges of interaction at the epistemic boundary, associated with coaching, reconciling, and answering. | |Abstract=Most long-lived organizational deceptions require the cooperation of outsiders who are close enough to the deception to suspect it, yet deliberately limit their knowledge so as to maintain plausible deniability. The interaction of such “proximate outsiders” with insiders—those who are fully “in the know”—can be a delicate affair, yet its careful management is essential to the survival of the deception. I analyze a phone conversation between Ponzi schemer Bernard Madoff and executives at Fairfield Greenwich, the investment firm that funneled him the most money, in which they discussed an impending SEC examination. First I examine Madoff’s attempts to cajole the executives into affirming (to Madoff and eventually to the SEC) that their hands-off approach to his operation was unremarkable. Next I consider two instances in which Madoff floundered in his explanations, repeatedly aborting and restarting sentences as he attempted to explain the inexplicable and reconcile the irreconcilable. Finally, I analyze Madoff’s handling of two of the executives’ more intrusive questions, and the part that each side played in the resulting non-answer. The three parts of the analysis illustrate what I argue are recurring and generalizable challenges of interaction at the epistemic boundary, associated with coaching, reconciling, and answering. | ||
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Latest revision as of 01:03, 27 December 2019
| Gibson2016 | |
|---|---|
| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Gibson2016 |
| Author(s) | David R. Gibson |
| Title | Ignorance at risk: interaction at the epistemic boundary of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme |
| Editor(s) | |
| Tag(s) | EMCA, Epistemics, Deception, Repair, Secret |
| Publisher | |
| Year | 2016 |
| Language | English |
| City | |
| Month | |
| Journal | Qualitative Sociology |
| Volume | 39 |
| Number | 3 |
| Pages | 221–246 |
| URL | Link |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11133-016-9336-5 |
| ISBN | |
| Organization | |
| Institution | |
| School | |
| Type | |
| Edition | |
| Series | |
| Howpublished | |
| Book title | |
| Chapter | |
Abstract
Most long-lived organizational deceptions require the cooperation of outsiders who are close enough to the deception to suspect it, yet deliberately limit their knowledge so as to maintain plausible deniability. The interaction of such “proximate outsiders” with insiders—those who are fully “in the know”—can be a delicate affair, yet its careful management is essential to the survival of the deception. I analyze a phone conversation between Ponzi schemer Bernard Madoff and executives at Fairfield Greenwich, the investment firm that funneled him the most money, in which they discussed an impending SEC examination. First I examine Madoff’s attempts to cajole the executives into affirming (to Madoff and eventually to the SEC) that their hands-off approach to his operation was unremarkable. Next I consider two instances in which Madoff floundered in his explanations, repeatedly aborting and restarting sentences as he attempted to explain the inexplicable and reconcile the irreconcilable. Finally, I analyze Madoff’s handling of two of the executives’ more intrusive questions, and the part that each side played in the resulting non-answer. The three parts of the analysis illustrate what I argue are recurring and generalizable challenges of interaction at the epistemic boundary, associated with coaching, reconciling, and answering.
Notes
