Difference between revisions of "Stevanovic2014"

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{{BibEntry
 
{{BibEntry
 
|BibType=ARTICLE
 
|BibType=ARTICLE
|Author(s)=Melisa Stevanovic; Anssi Peräkyläa
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|Author(s)=Melisa Stevanovic; Anssi Peräkylä;
 
|Title=Three orders in the organization of human action: On the interface between knowledge, power, and emotion in interaction and social relations
 
|Title=Three orders in the organization of human action: On the interface between knowledge, power, and emotion in interaction and social relations
 
|Tag(s)=EMCA; Action recognition; social relations; conversation analysis; status; stance; epistemic rights; deontic rights; emotion;
 
|Tag(s)=EMCA; Action recognition; social relations; conversation analysis; status; stance; epistemic rights; deontic rights; emotion;

Revision as of 07:54, 13 January 2019

Stevanovic2014
BibType ARTICLE
Key Stevanovic2014
Author(s) Melisa Stevanovic, Anssi Peräkylä
Title Three orders in the organization of human action: On the interface between knowledge, power, and emotion in interaction and social relations
Editor(s)
Tag(s) EMCA, Action recognition, social relations, conversation analysis, status, stance, epistemic rights, deontic rights, emotion
Publisher
Year 2014
Language
City
Month
Journal Language in Society
Volume 43
Number 2
Pages 185–207
URL Link
DOI 10.1017/S0047404514000037
ISBN
Organization
Institution
School
Type
Edition
Series
Howpublished
Book title
Chapter

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Abstract

All social life is based on people's ability to recognize what others are doing. Recently, the mechanisms underlying this human ability have become the focus of a growing multidisciplinary interest. This article contributes to this line of research by considering how people's orientations to who they are to each other are built-in in the organization action. We outline a unifying theoretical framework in which the basic facets of human social relations are seen as being anchored in three orders—epistemic order, deontic order, and emotional order—each of which, we argue, also pertains to action recognition. This framework allows us to account for common ambiguities in action recognition and to describe relationship negotiations involving a complex interface between knowledge, power, and emotion.

Notes