Difference between revisions of "Ogien2013"
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|DOI=10.1007/s11614-013-0099-x | |DOI=10.1007/s11614-013-0099-x | ||
|Abstract=This article presents a reconstruction of Mead’s naturalistic argument in order to assess its significance for today’s sociological analysis. To do so, it goes back to the early criticisms Garfinkel has addressed to Mead in a manuscript written in 1948. It considers the three points of contention that are discussed in this text (the Self versus action; the social act versus practical activity; role versus practice) and claims that Garfinkel’s objections to Mead’s work are similar to those that have been raised against Blumer’s interpretation of Mead in the 1970s. The article then contends that this common misunderstanding of Mead’s naturalistic stance stems from a misinterpretation of his conception of the “significant symbol” which has often been mistaken for as a conception of meaning. This might shed light on the reasons why social naturalism has by and large been ignored by sociologists as well as outline the uses sociology should still make of Mead’s proposals. | |Abstract=This article presents a reconstruction of Mead’s naturalistic argument in order to assess its significance for today’s sociological analysis. To do so, it goes back to the early criticisms Garfinkel has addressed to Mead in a manuscript written in 1948. It considers the three points of contention that are discussed in this text (the Self versus action; the social act versus practical activity; role versus practice) and claims that Garfinkel’s objections to Mead’s work are similar to those that have been raised against Blumer’s interpretation of Mead in the 1970s. The article then contends that this common misunderstanding of Mead’s naturalistic stance stems from a misinterpretation of his conception of the “significant symbol” which has often been mistaken for as a conception of meaning. This might shed light on the reasons why social naturalism has by and large been ignored by sociologists as well as outline the uses sociology should still make of Mead’s proposals. | ||
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Revision as of 07:14, 28 February 2016
| Ogien2013 | |
|---|---|
| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Ogien2013 |
| Author(s) | Albert Ogien |
| Title | Garfinkel reading Mead. What should sociology do with social naturalism? |
| Editor(s) | |
| Tag(s) | EMCA, Pragmatism, Ethnomethodology, Social naturalism, Signifcant symbol, Self, Taking the role of the other, Mead, Garfnkel, Durkheim |
| Publisher | |
| Year | 2013 |
| Language | |
| City | |
| Month | |
| Journal | Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie |
| Volume | 38 |
| Number | Supplement 1 |
| Pages | 97–113 |
| URL | Link |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11614-013-0099-x |
| ISBN | |
| Organization | |
| Institution | |
| School | |
| Type | |
| Edition | |
| Series | |
| Howpublished | |
| Book title | |
| Chapter | |
Abstract
This article presents a reconstruction of Mead’s naturalistic argument in order to assess its significance for today’s sociological analysis. To do so, it goes back to the early criticisms Garfinkel has addressed to Mead in a manuscript written in 1948. It considers the three points of contention that are discussed in this text (the Self versus action; the social act versus practical activity; role versus practice) and claims that Garfinkel’s objections to Mead’s work are similar to those that have been raised against Blumer’s interpretation of Mead in the 1970s. The article then contends that this common misunderstanding of Mead’s naturalistic stance stems from a misinterpretation of his conception of the “significant symbol” which has often been mistaken for as a conception of meaning. This might shed light on the reasons why social naturalism has by and large been ignored by sociologists as well as outline the uses sociology should still make of Mead’s proposals.
Notes
