Difference between revisions of "Keevallik2011a"

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|Author(s)=Leelo Keevallik;
 
|Author(s)=Leelo Keevallik;
 
|Title=The terms of not knowing and social affiliation
 
|Title=The terms of not knowing and social affiliation
|Editor(s)=T. Stivers; L. Mondada; J. Steensig
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|Editor(s)=Tanya Stivers; Lorenza Mondada; Jakob Steensig
 
|Tag(s)=EMCA; Epistemics; Affiliation;
 
|Tag(s)=EMCA; Epistemics; Affiliation;
 
|Key=Keevallik2011a
 
|Key=Keevallik2011a
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|Address=Cambridge
 
|Address=Cambridge
 
|Booktitle=The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation
 
|Booktitle=The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation
|Pages=184-206
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|Pages=184–206
|Abstract=There is a disparity between expressing what we know and what we don't know in interaction. Participants regularly convey what they know implicitly by stating, telling, assessing, etc. In contrast, what they don't know is typically claimed outright. However, there are sequential environments in conversation where knowledge displays are relevant. For example, the recipient of a question that asks for information is accountable for displaying knowledge. The asker of the question, by virtue of having asked this particular recipient, presupposes that she knows and can answer. Although the recipient has several resources to deal with this, simply saying “I don't know” is a highly sensitive act and has social consequences. Relying on Estonian interaction, this chapter will look at claims of “no knowledge” (mai tea, the counterpart of English I don't know), showing parallels in Swedish, Russian and English.
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|URL=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/morality-of-knowledge-in-conversation/terms-of-not-knowing/58EFD4F05A8CE5A84E9A5647A4509B13
 
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|DOI=10.1017/CBO9780511921674.009
Issues of how speakers manage claims of knowledge across turns have been raised in a number of interactional studies (Beach and Metzger 1997; Goodwin 1979; Heritage 1984a; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Keevallik 2008; Labov and Fanshel 1977; Stivers 2005a). Some of them also specifically deal with lack of, or lesser, knowledge. For example, claiming secondary knowledge about something has been shown to function as a “fishing” device for the recipient to provide primary knowledge about the matter (Pomerantz 1980). Claiming forgetfulness can be a means of encouraging another knowing speaker to participate in the conversation (Goodwin 1987).
 
 
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Latest revision as of 11:53, 28 November 2019

Keevallik2011a
BibType INCOLLECTION
Key Keevallik2011a
Author(s) Leelo Keevallik
Title The terms of not knowing and social affiliation
Editor(s) Tanya Stivers, Lorenza Mondada, Jakob Steensig
Tag(s) EMCA, Epistemics, Affiliation
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Year 2011
Language
City Cambridge
Month
Journal
Volume
Number
Pages 184–206
URL Link
DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511921674.009
ISBN
Organization
Institution
School
Type
Edition
Series
Howpublished
Book title The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation
Chapter

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Abstract


Notes