Difference between revisions of "Billig1999"

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|Author(s)=Michael Billig;
 
|Author(s)=Michael Billig;
 
|Title=Whose terms? Whose ordinariness? Rhetoric and ideology in conversation analysis
 
|Title=Whose terms? Whose ordinariness? Rhetoric and ideology in conversation analysis
|Tag(s)=EMCA; Conversation Analysis; Methodology; Rhetoric; Schegloff; Basic Resources;  
+
|Tag(s)=EMCA; Conversation Analysis; Methodology; Rhetoric; Schegloff; Basic Resources;
 
|Key=Billig1999
 
|Key=Billig1999
 
|Year=1999
 
|Year=1999
 
|Journal=Discourse & Society
 
|Journal=Discourse & Society
 
|Volume=10
 
|Volume=10
|Pages=543-558
+
|Number=4
|URL=http://das.sagepub.com/content/10/4/543.short
+
|Pages=543–558
 +
|URL=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0957926599010004005
 
|DOI=10.1177/0957926599010004005
 
|DOI=10.1177/0957926599010004005
|Abstract=This article examines Schegloff's (1997) defence of Conversation Analysis (CA) and his attack on critical discourse analysis. The article focuses on Schegloff's claims that CA takes an empirical stance without a priori assumptions and that it examines participants' talk in `their own terms'. It is suggested that these claims are problematic, and that CA, as depicted by Schegloff, contains an ideological view of the social world. This can be seen by examining CA's own rhetoric, which conversation analysts themselves tend to take for granted. First, CA uses a specialist rhetoric which is literally not the participants' own terms. Moreover, this specialist rhetoric enables conversation analysts to `disattend' to the topics of conversation. Second, CA's `foundational rhetoric' is examined. It is suggested that this foundational rhetoric, which includes terms such as `conversation', `member', etc., conveys a participatory view of the world, in which equal rights of speakership are often assumed. The assumptions of these rhetorical conventions are revealed if they are applied to talk in which direct power is exercised. In this respect, CA is not, as Schegloff suggests, ideologically neutral, but habitually deploys a rhetoric that conveys a contestable view of social order.
+
|Abstract=This article examines Schegloff's (1997) defence of Conversation Analysis (CA) and his attack on critical discourse analysis. The article focuses on Schegloff's claims that CA takes an empirical stance without a priori assumptions and that it examines participants' talk in 'their own terms'. It is suggested that these claims are problematic, and that CA, as depicted by Schegloff, contains an ideological view of the social world. This can be seen by examining CA's own rhetoric, which conversation analysts themselves tend to take for granted. First, CA uses a specialist rhetoric which is literally not the participants' own terms. Moreover, this specialist rhetoric enables conversation analysts to 'disattend' to the topics of conversation. Second, CA's 'foundational rhetoric' is examined. It is suggested that this foundational rhetoric, which includes terms such as 'conversation', 'member', etc., conveys a participatory view of the world, in which equal rights of speakership are often assumed. The assumptions of these rhetorical conventions are revealed if they are applied to talk in which direct power is exercised. In this respect, CA is not, as Schegloff suggests, ideologically neutral, but habitually deploys a rhetoric that conveys a contestable view of social order.
 
}}
 
}}

Latest revision as of 00:36, 27 October 2019

Billig1999
BibType ARTICLE
Key Billig1999
Author(s) Michael Billig
Title Whose terms? Whose ordinariness? Rhetoric and ideology in conversation analysis
Editor(s)
Tag(s) EMCA, Conversation Analysis, Methodology, Rhetoric, Schegloff, Basic Resources
Publisher
Year 1999
Language
City
Month
Journal Discourse & Society
Volume 10
Number 4
Pages 543–558
URL Link
DOI 10.1177/0957926599010004005
ISBN
Organization
Institution
School
Type
Edition
Series
Howpublished
Book title
Chapter

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Abstract

This article examines Schegloff's (1997) defence of Conversation Analysis (CA) and his attack on critical discourse analysis. The article focuses on Schegloff's claims that CA takes an empirical stance without a priori assumptions and that it examines participants' talk in 'their own terms'. It is suggested that these claims are problematic, and that CA, as depicted by Schegloff, contains an ideological view of the social world. This can be seen by examining CA's own rhetoric, which conversation analysts themselves tend to take for granted. First, CA uses a specialist rhetoric which is literally not the participants' own terms. Moreover, this specialist rhetoric enables conversation analysts to 'disattend' to the topics of conversation. Second, CA's 'foundational rhetoric' is examined. It is suggested that this foundational rhetoric, which includes terms such as 'conversation', 'member', etc., conveys a participatory view of the world, in which equal rights of speakership are often assumed. The assumptions of these rhetorical conventions are revealed if they are applied to talk in which direct power is exercised. In this respect, CA is not, as Schegloff suggests, ideologically neutral, but habitually deploys a rhetoric that conveys a contestable view of social order.

Notes