Difference between revisions of "Definition"
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− | | | + | | Authors = '''Elwys De Stefani''' (University of Heidelberg, Germany) (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5414-8383) |
| To cite = De Stefani, Elwys. (2023). Definition. In Alexandra Gubina, Elliott M. Hoey & Chase Wesley Raymond (Eds.), ''Encyclopedia of Terminology for Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics''. International Society for Conversation Analysis (ISCA). DOI: [] | | To cite = De Stefani, Elwys. (2023). Definition. In Alexandra Gubina, Elliott M. Hoey & Chase Wesley Raymond (Eds.), ''Encyclopedia of Terminology for Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics''. International Society for Conversation Analysis (ISCA). DOI: [] | ||
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* preventing and solving problems of understanding, by explicating the meaning of a word with a definition (Deppermann & De Stefani 2019). | * preventing and solving problems of understanding, by explicating the meaning of a word with a definition (Deppermann & De Stefani 2019). | ||
− | In natural conversation, definitions are highly indexical and often lack the properties expected from a language philosophical perspective. Hence, they may be ostensive, whereby an interactant displays with embodied resources what a word means (e.g., by pointing to a material instance of it), in concomitance with an existential structure (''this is x''; Deppermann 2016). Definitions have also been described as occurring recurrently in specific formats, such as German ''x heißt y'' (‘x means y’; Helmer 2020) or ''x is not y, it’s z'' (Deppermann & De Stefani 2019). | + | In natural conversation, definitions are highly '''[[Indexicality|indexical]]''' and often lack the properties expected from a language philosophical perspective. Hence, they may be ostensive, whereby an interactant displays with embodied resources what a word means (e.g., by pointing to a material instance of it), in concomitance with an existential structure (''this is x''; Deppermann 2016). Definitions have also been described as occurring recurrently in specific formats, such as German ''x heißt y'' (‘x means y’; Helmer 2020) or ''x is not y, it’s z'' (Deppermann & De Stefani 2019). |
The following excerpt shows (a) how a definition emerges in a setting of argumentation in which (b) Karel uses a specific format (''x is not y, it’s z''). It is taken from a discussion between members of a Flemish mutual help group for people affected by Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS): | The following excerpt shows (a) how a definition emerges in a setting of argumentation in which (b) Karel uses a specific format (''x is not y, it’s z''). It is taken from a discussion between members of a Flemish mutual help group for people affected by Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS): |
Latest revision as of 19:09, 14 November 2023
Encyclopedia of Terminology for CA and IL: Definition | |
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Author(s): | Elwys De Stefani (University of Heidelberg, Germany) (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5414-8383) |
To cite: | De Stefani, Elwys. (2023). Definition. In Alexandra Gubina, Elliott M. Hoey & Chase Wesley Raymond (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Terminology for Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics. International Society for Conversation Analysis (ISCA). DOI: [] |
The concept of definition is variously used in linguistics, and has been discussed only marginally in interactional approaches. Based on philosophical considerations rooted in Antiquity (Aristotle) and revived in the Middle Ages (Thomas Aquinas), definitions have been described as stipulating the meaning of an expression. Definitions are thus discussed in various linguistic fields dealing with (lexical) semantics. In natural conversation, definitions of ordinary words (rather than of technical terms) are observable, and these rarely show the properties ascribed to them by logical philosophers. In interaction, definitions have been studied as practices involved in:
- arguing and defending one’s point of view (De Stefani & Sambre 2016, or, within argumentation theory, Kienpointner 1992);
- imparting knowledge (e.g., in didactical settings; Helmer 2021)
- preventing and solving problems of understanding, by explicating the meaning of a word with a definition (Deppermann & De Stefani 2019).
In natural conversation, definitions are highly indexical and often lack the properties expected from a language philosophical perspective. Hence, they may be ostensive, whereby an interactant displays with embodied resources what a word means (e.g., by pointing to a material instance of it), in concomitance with an existential structure (this is x; Deppermann 2016). Definitions have also been described as occurring recurrently in specific formats, such as German x heißt y (‘x means y’; Helmer 2020) or x is not y, it’s z (Deppermann & De Stefani 2019).
The following excerpt shows (a) how a definition emerges in a setting of argumentation in which (b) Karel uses a specific format (x is not y, it’s z). It is taken from a discussion between members of a Flemish mutual help group for people affected by Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS):
(1) [Deppermann & De Stefani 2019: 148] 01 Kar stilaan beginnen der meer en meer en zeker bij de jonge slowly more and more begin and certainly among the young 02 -> artsen beginnen meer en meer in te zien .h dat CVS dat we dat doctors more and more begin understanding .h that CFS that we 03 -> niet moeten benaderen .h als een euh syndroom of ‘k weet niet do not have to approach it .h as a uh syndrome or I don’t know 04 wat waar we niet kunnen aan beginnen, what where we can’t do anything about 05 -> .h nee het is <LYME.> .h no it is lyme (disease) 06 (1.3) 07 alstublieft, please 08 (0.4) 09 -> plus euh: plus co-infecties. plus uh plus co-infections
At line 02 Karel produces a negative definitional component by saying that we must not approach CFS as ‘a syndrome’, thereby invalidating a possible understanding of the word CFS. After a further, prosodically emphasized, negative token (line 05), he articulates a positive definition, stating that CFS ‘is Lyme (disease)’ (line 05). The resulting format recalls stipulative definitions where the definiendum (‘CFS’) is linked to the definiens (‘Lyme (disease)’) by the copula ‘is’. The TRP at the end of line 05 opens up the possibility for Karel’s recipients to produce a response to the definition he has just articulated. This opportunity is not taken (lines 06–08) and Karel slightly modifies the definiens, which is now Lyme disease ‘plus co-infections’ (line 09). This highlights the indexicality and context-sensitivity of definitions articulated in conversation.
Additional Related Entries:
- [Description]
- [Demonstration]
- [Explanation]
Cited References:
Deppermann, A. (2016). La définition comme action multimodale pour des enjeux pratiques: définir pour instruire à l’auto-école. Langages, 204(4), 83–101.
Deppermann, A. & De Stefani, E. (2019). Defining in talk-in-interaction: Recipient-design through negative definitional components. Journal of Pragmatics, 140, 140–155.
De Stefani, E. & Sambre, P. (2016). L’exhibition et la négociation du savoir dans les pratiques définitoires. L’interaction autour du syndrome de fatigue chronique dans un groupe d’entraide. Langages, 204(4), 27–42.
Helmer, H. (2020). How do speakers define the meaning of expressions? The case of German x heißt y (‘x means y’). Discourse Processes, 57(3), 278–299.
Helmer, H. (2021). Humorous or occasioned instructions: Learning the ‘shoulder check’ in theoretical and practical driving lessons. International Journal of Applied Linguistics, 31(1), 109–131.
Kienpointer, M. (1992). Alltagslogik. Struktur und Funktion von Argumentationsmustern. Frommann-holzboog.
Additional References:
Bilmes, J. (2011). Occasioned semantics: A systematic approach to meaning in talk. Human Studies, 34(2), 129–153.
Deppermann, A. (2005). Conversational interpretation of lexical items and conversational contrasting. In A. Hakulinen & M. Selting (Eds.), Syntax and lexis in conversation (pp. 289–317). John Benjamins.
De Stefani, E. (2005). Les demandes de définition en français parlé: aspects grammaticaux et interactionnels. Travaux Neuchâtelois de Linguistique, 41, 147–163.
Martin, R. (1990). La definition ‘naturelle’. In J. Chaurand & J. Mazière (Eds.), La définition (pp. 86–95). Larousse.
Temmermann, M. (2009). Communicative aspects of definitions in classroom interaction: Learning to define in class for first and second language learners. Linguistics and Education, 20(2), 126–144.