Disclaimer

Encyclopedia of Terminology for CA and IL: Disclaimer
Author(s):	Ann Weatherall (University of Bedfordshire, United Kingdom) (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0298-6681)
To cite:	Weatherall, Ann. (2023). Disclaimer. In Alexandra Gubina, Elliott M. Hoey & Chase Wesley Raymond (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Terminology for Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics. International Society for Conversation Analysis (ISCA). DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/8PH96

A disclaimer is a form of explanation that functions rhetorically to deflect an anticipated attribution about the identity of the speaker. For example, “I am a vegetarian but not because of animal cruelty” is a statement that recognises ethical reasons for not eating meat but dismisses their applicability to the individual concerned (see Wilson, Weatherall & Butler 2004: 571).

The concept was originally developed by Hewitt and Stokes (1975) as part of a more general sociological project that sought to understand how people maintain and manage identities in social interaction at moments when problems are projected with attributing meaning. Examples they presented included “I’m not prejudiced but” and “I know this sounds stupid”.

Billig’s (1987) rhetorical approach to social psychology identified disclaimers as a subcategory of a type of classical argumentative tactic that forestalls objections. Beyond impression management, Billig proposed that disclaimers show flexibility in the ways attitudes are articulated, thereby questioning widespread assumptions on the independence of attitudes and their expression.

Early in the development of a discursive approach to prejudice and discrimination, Potter and Wetherell (1987) showed that disclaimers are embedded in complex linguistic structures involving contrasts and contradictions that legitimate bias, as is shown in the following example taken from an interview study investigating racism:

(Potter & Wetherell 1987: 47)

Respondent:  I’m not anti them all you know, I, 
             if they’re willing to get on and be like us; 
             but if they’re just going to come here, 
             just to be able to use our social welfares and 
             stuff like that, then why don’t they stay home?

Conversation-analytic work on disclaimers is distinctive for describing in detail the different formats and sequential positions of disclaimers in mundane and institutional settings. For example, Weatherall (2011) found that "I don’t know" in English functioned as a pre-positioned hedge to knowledge claims. In medical interaction, Lindström and Karlsson (2016) showed the equivalent Swedish expression "jag vet inte" was used by doctors in a similar way to problematize access or rights to knowledge.

Additional Related Entries:

• Account
• Repair

Cited References:

Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology. Cambridge University Press.

Hewitt, J. P., & Stokes, R. (1975). Disclaimers. American Sociological Review, 40(1), 1–11.

Lindström, J., & Karlsson, S. (2016). Tensions in the epistemic domain and claims of no-knowledge: A study of Swedish medical interaction. Journal of Pragmatics, 106, 129-147.

Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. Sage.

Weatherall, A. (2011). "I don’t know" as a pre-positioned hedge. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 44 (4), 317-337.

Wilson, M. S., Weatherall, A., & Butler, C. (2004). A Rhetorical Approach to Discussions about Health and Vegetarianism. Journal of Health Psychology, 9(4), 567–581.

Additional References:

Augoustinos, M., & Every, D. (2007). The language of “race” and prejudice: A discourse of denial, reason, and liberal-practical politics. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 26(2), 123–141.

Scott, M. B., & Lyman, S. M. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review, 33(1), 46-62.

Laury, R., & Helasvuo, M. L. (2016). Disclaiming epistemic access with ‘know’ and ‘remember’ in Finnish. Journal of Pragmatics, 106, 80-96.