Difference between revisions of "Drew2018"
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|Author(s)=Paul Drew; | |Author(s)=Paul Drew; | ||
|Title=Epistemics in social interaction | |Title=Epistemics in social interaction | ||
| − | |Tag(s)=Conversation | + | |Tag(s)=Conversation Analysis; EMCA; conversation analysis; correction; correction; epistemics; repair; states of knowledge; turn design; territories of knowledge; action formation; sequence expansion; |
|Key=Drew2018 | |Key=Drew2018 | ||
|Year=2018 | |Year=2018 | ||
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|Number=1 | |Number=1 | ||
|Pages=163–187 | |Pages=163–187 | ||
| − | |URL= | + | |URL=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1461445617734347 |
|DOI=10.1177/1461445617734347 | |DOI=10.1177/1461445617734347 | ||
|Abstract=My argument here is principally that the ubiquity of (the relevance of) epistemics is evident in the ways in which knowledge claims and attributions of knowledge to self and other (1) are embedded in turns and sequences, (2) inform the design of turns at talk, (3) are amended in the corrections that speakers sometimes make, to change from one epistemic stance to another (e.g. from K+ to K−), and (4) are contested, in the occasional ‘struggles' between participants, as to which of them has epistemic primacy. I show that these cannot be understood in cognitive terms; furthermore, I show that epistemics – again the attribution of knowledge to self and other – is ‘real' for participants. That is, in these four practices and aspects of interaction (i.e. embedding, turn design, correction and contesting) it is evident that participants orient to their states of knowledge relative to one another, on a moment-by-moment, turn-by-turn basis. | |Abstract=My argument here is principally that the ubiquity of (the relevance of) epistemics is evident in the ways in which knowledge claims and attributions of knowledge to self and other (1) are embedded in turns and sequences, (2) inform the design of turns at talk, (3) are amended in the corrections that speakers sometimes make, to change from one epistemic stance to another (e.g. from K+ to K−), and (4) are contested, in the occasional ‘struggles' between participants, as to which of them has epistemic primacy. I show that these cannot be understood in cognitive terms; furthermore, I show that epistemics – again the attribution of knowledge to self and other – is ‘real' for participants. That is, in these four practices and aspects of interaction (i.e. embedding, turn design, correction and contesting) it is evident that participants orient to their states of knowledge relative to one another, on a moment-by-moment, turn-by-turn basis. | ||
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Latest revision as of 11:06, 18 May 2018
| Drew2018 | |
|---|---|
| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Drew2018 |
| Author(s) | Paul Drew |
| Title | Epistemics in social interaction |
| Editor(s) | |
| Tag(s) | Conversation Analysis, EMCA, conversation analysis, correction, correction, epistemics, repair, states of knowledge, turn design, territories of knowledge, action formation, sequence expansion |
| Publisher | |
| Year | 2018 |
| Language | English |
| City | |
| Month | |
| Journal | Discourse Studies |
| Volume | 20 |
| Number | 1 |
| Pages | 163–187 |
| URL | Link |
| DOI | 10.1177/1461445617734347 |
| ISBN | |
| Organization | |
| Institution | |
| School | |
| Type | |
| Edition | |
| Series | |
| Howpublished | |
| Book title | |
| Chapter | |
Abstract
My argument here is principally that the ubiquity of (the relevance of) epistemics is evident in the ways in which knowledge claims and attributions of knowledge to self and other (1) are embedded in turns and sequences, (2) inform the design of turns at talk, (3) are amended in the corrections that speakers sometimes make, to change from one epistemic stance to another (e.g. from K+ to K−), and (4) are contested, in the occasional ‘struggles' between participants, as to which of them has epistemic primacy. I show that these cannot be understood in cognitive terms; furthermore, I show that epistemics – again the attribution of knowledge to self and other – is ‘real' for participants. That is, in these four practices and aspects of interaction (i.e. embedding, turn design, correction and contesting) it is evident that participants orient to their states of knowledge relative to one another, on a moment-by-moment, turn-by-turn basis.
Notes
