Difference between revisions of "Ruggerone2013"
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|Author(s)=Lucia Ruggerone | |Author(s)=Lucia Ruggerone | ||
|Title=Science and Life-World: Husserl, Schutz, Garfinkel | |Title=Science and Life-World: Husserl, Schutz, Garfinkel | ||
| − | |Tag(s)=EMCA; Ethnomethodology; Garfinkel; Phenomenology; | + | |Tag(s)=EMCA; Ethnomethodology; Garfinkel; Phenomenology; |
|Key=Ruggerone2013 | |Key=Ruggerone2013 | ||
|Year=2013 | |Year=2013 | ||
|Journal=Human Studies | |Journal=Human Studies | ||
|Volume=36 | |Volume=36 | ||
| − | |Pages= | + | |Number=2 |
| + | |Pages=179–197 | ||
| + | |URL=http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10746-012-9249-6 | ||
| + | |DOI=10.1007/s10746-012-9249-6 | ||
| + | |Abstract=In this article I intend to explore the conception of science as it emerges from the work of Husserl, Schutz, and Garfinkel. By concentrating specifically on the issue of science, I attempt to show that Garfinkel’s views on the relationship between science and the everyday world are much closer to Husserl’s stance than to the Schutzian perspective. To this end, I explore Husserl’s notion of science especially as it emerges in the Crisis of European Sciences, where he describes the failure of European science and again preaches for a return to the “things themselves”. In this respect I interpret ethnomethodology’s most recent program as an answer to that call originating from a sociological domain. I then argue that the Husserlian turn within ethnomethodology marks the split between Garfinkel and Schutz. In fact I try to show that Schutz’s epistemological work is only partially inspired by phenomenology and that his conception of science retains a rationalist stance that ethnomethodology opposes. In the final section I briefly discuss Garfinkel’s most recent program as a way of closing the gap between theory and experience by linking the topics of science to the radical experiential phenomena. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 09:07, 27 February 2016
| Ruggerone2013 | |
|---|---|
| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Ruggerone2013 |
| Author(s) | Lucia Ruggerone |
| Title | Science and Life-World: Husserl, Schutz, Garfinkel |
| Editor(s) | |
| Tag(s) | EMCA, Ethnomethodology, Garfinkel, Phenomenology |
| Publisher | |
| Year | 2013 |
| Language | |
| City | |
| Month | |
| Journal | Human Studies |
| Volume | 36 |
| Number | 2 |
| Pages | 179–197 |
| URL | Link |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10746-012-9249-6 |
| ISBN | |
| Organization | |
| Institution | |
| School | |
| Type | |
| Edition | |
| Series | |
| Howpublished | |
| Book title | |
| Chapter | |
Abstract
In this article I intend to explore the conception of science as it emerges from the work of Husserl, Schutz, and Garfinkel. By concentrating specifically on the issue of science, I attempt to show that Garfinkel’s views on the relationship between science and the everyday world are much closer to Husserl’s stance than to the Schutzian perspective. To this end, I explore Husserl’s notion of science especially as it emerges in the Crisis of European Sciences, where he describes the failure of European science and again preaches for a return to the “things themselves”. In this respect I interpret ethnomethodology’s most recent program as an answer to that call originating from a sociological domain. I then argue that the Husserlian turn within ethnomethodology marks the split between Garfinkel and Schutz. In fact I try to show that Schutz’s epistemological work is only partially inspired by phenomenology and that his conception of science retains a rationalist stance that ethnomethodology opposes. In the final section I briefly discuss Garfinkel’s most recent program as a way of closing the gap between theory and experience by linking the topics of science to the radical experiential phenomena.
Notes
