Difference between revisions of "Speer2012c"
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|DOI=10.1177/0190272511432939 | |DOI=10.1177/0190272511432939 | ||
|Abstract=This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement. | |Abstract=This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement. | ||
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Revision as of 02:29, 22 February 2016
Speer2012c | |
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BibType | ARTICLE |
Key | Speer2012c |
Author(s) | Susan A. Speer |
Title | The interactional organization of self-praise: epistemics, preference organisation and implications for identity research |
Editor(s) | |
Tag(s) | EMCA, Epistemics, Preference, Identity, self-praise, preference organization, conversation analysis, self-assessment, identity, compliments, self-repair |
Publisher | |
Year | 2012 |
Language | |
City | |
Month | |
Journal | Social Psychology Quarterly |
Volume | 75 |
Number | 1 |
Pages | 52–79 |
URL | Link |
DOI | 10.1177/0190272511432939 |
ISBN | |
Organization | |
Institution | |
School | |
Type | |
Edition | |
Series | |
Howpublished | |
Book title | |
Chapter |
Abstract
This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement.
Notes