Difference between revisions of "Speer2012c"

From emcawiki
Jump to: navigation, search
m
Line 9: Line 9:
 
|Volume=75
 
|Volume=75
 
|Number=1
 
|Number=1
|Pages=52-79
+
|Pages=52–79
 +
|URL=http://spq.sagepub.com/content/75/1/52
 
|DOI=10.1177/0190272511432939
 
|DOI=10.1177/0190272511432939
 
|Abstract=This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement.
 
|Abstract=This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement.
 
}}
 
}}

Revision as of 02:29, 22 February 2016

Speer2012c
BibType ARTICLE
Key Speer2012c
Author(s) Susan A. Speer
Title The interactional organization of self-praise: epistemics, preference organisation and implications for identity research
Editor(s)
Tag(s) EMCA, Epistemics, Preference, Identity, self-praise, preference organization, conversation analysis, self-assessment, identity, compliments, self-repair
Publisher
Year 2012
Language
City
Month
Journal Social Psychology Quarterly
Volume 75
Number 1
Pages 52–79
URL Link
DOI 10.1177/0190272511432939
ISBN
Organization
Institution
School
Type
Edition
Series
Howpublished
Book title
Chapter

Download BibTex

Abstract

This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement.

Notes