Difference between revisions of "Speer2012c"
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| + | |URL=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0190272511432939 | ||
|DOI=10.1177/0190272511432939 | |DOI=10.1177/0190272511432939 | ||
|Abstract=This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement. | |Abstract=This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement. | ||
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Latest revision as of 06:16, 30 November 2019
| Speer2012c | |
|---|---|
| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Speer2012c |
| Author(s) | Susan A. Speer |
| Title | The interactional organization of self-praise: epistemics, preference organisation and implications for identity research |
| Editor(s) | |
| Tag(s) | EMCA, Epistemics, Preference, Identity, self-praise, preference organization, conversation analysis, self-assessment, identity, compliments, self-repair |
| Publisher | |
| Year | 2012 |
| Language | |
| City | |
| Month | |
| Journal | Social Psychology Quarterly |
| Volume | 75 |
| Number | 1 |
| Pages | 52–79 |
| URL | Link |
| DOI | 10.1177/0190272511432939 |
| ISBN | |
| Organization | |
| Institution | |
| School | |
| Type | |
| Edition | |
| Series | |
| Howpublished | |
| Book title | |
| Chapter | |
Abstract
This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement.
Notes
