Difference between revisions of "Edwards2006"
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|BibType=ARTICLE | |BibType=ARTICLE | ||
|Author(s)=Derek Edwards; | |Author(s)=Derek Edwards; | ||
| − | |Title=Discourse, cognition and social practices: the rich surface of language | + | |Title=Discourse, cognition and social practices: the rich surface of language and social interaction |
| − | and social interaction | ||
|Tag(s)=Discursive Psychology; cognition; conversation analysis; discourse; intentionality; | |Tag(s)=Discursive Psychology; cognition; conversation analysis; discourse; intentionality; | ||
|Key=Edwards2006 | |Key=Edwards2006 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 11: | ||
|Number=1 | |Number=1 | ||
|Pages=41–49 | |Pages=41–49 | ||
| − | |URL= | + | |URL=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1461445606059551 |
| + | |DOI=10.1177/1461445606059551 | ||
|Abstract=Discursive psychology (DP) approaches discourse not as the product or expression of thoughts or mental states lying behind or beneath it, but as a domain of public accountability in which psychological states are made relevant. DP draws heavily on conversation analysis in examining in close empirical detail how ostensibly psychological themes are handled and managed as part of talk’s everyday interactional business. A brief worked example is offered, in which the intentionality of a person’s actions is handled in the course of police interrogation, in ways that perform police work. Degrees of intentionality are partialled out with regard to specific actions or components of actions, and with regard to how actions are described in ways that map onto how crime categories are defined in law. Cognitive states are generally relevant in discourse in the same manner, as participants’ concerns with regard to action categories and accountability on and for the occasions they are invoked. | |Abstract=Discursive psychology (DP) approaches discourse not as the product or expression of thoughts or mental states lying behind or beneath it, but as a domain of public accountability in which psychological states are made relevant. DP draws heavily on conversation analysis in examining in close empirical detail how ostensibly psychological themes are handled and managed as part of talk’s everyday interactional business. A brief worked example is offered, in which the intentionality of a person’s actions is handled in the course of police interrogation, in ways that perform police work. Degrees of intentionality are partialled out with regard to specific actions or components of actions, and with regard to how actions are described in ways that map onto how crime categories are defined in law. Cognitive states are generally relevant in discourse in the same manner, as participants’ concerns with regard to action categories and accountability on and for the occasions they are invoked. | ||
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Latest revision as of 10:58, 13 November 2019
| Edwards2006 | |
|---|---|
| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Edwards2006 |
| Author(s) | Derek Edwards |
| Title | Discourse, cognition and social practices: the rich surface of language and social interaction |
| Editor(s) | |
| Tag(s) | Discursive Psychology, cognition, conversation analysis, discourse, intentionality |
| Publisher | |
| Year | 2006 |
| Language | English |
| City | |
| Month | |
| Journal | Discourse Studies |
| Volume | 8 |
| Number | 1 |
| Pages | 41–49 |
| URL | Link |
| DOI | 10.1177/1461445606059551 |
| ISBN | |
| Organization | |
| Institution | |
| School | |
| Type | |
| Edition | |
| Series | |
| Howpublished | |
| Book title | |
| Chapter | |
Abstract
Discursive psychology (DP) approaches discourse not as the product or expression of thoughts or mental states lying behind or beneath it, but as a domain of public accountability in which psychological states are made relevant. DP draws heavily on conversation analysis in examining in close empirical detail how ostensibly psychological themes are handled and managed as part of talk’s everyday interactional business. A brief worked example is offered, in which the intentionality of a person’s actions is handled in the course of police interrogation, in ways that perform police work. Degrees of intentionality are partialled out with regard to specific actions or components of actions, and with regard to how actions are described in ways that map onto how crime categories are defined in law. Cognitive states are generally relevant in discourse in the same manner, as participants’ concerns with regard to action categories and accountability on and for the occasions they are invoked.
Notes
