Difference between revisions of "Maynard2006b"
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| − | |Pages= | + | |Pages=105–115 |
| − | |URL=https:// | + | |URL=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1461445606059560 |
|DOI=10.1177/1461445606059560 | |DOI=10.1177/1461445606059560 | ||
|Abstract=Suggesting that much of social science is still wedded to the ‘dogma of the ghost in the machine,’ I discuss my ethnomethodological and conversation analytic approach to the assembly of cognitive objects. It is important to reverse the usual social psychological metalanguage of mind causing behavior, and see how practices in interaction operate to display cognitive states of participants. Two examples are given: one in regard to the assembly of gestalts, including social actions in talk, and the other concerning the production of responses as accountable phenomena in the survey interview. While advances are being made in brain imaging, the connections between the neurobiology of the mind and the practices embedded in human conduct are tenuous at best. For the social scientist, approaching cognition through practices puts ghosts and other ephemera in abeyance and allows for analysis of the detail exhibited in behavior when minds are purportedly at work. | |Abstract=Suggesting that much of social science is still wedded to the ‘dogma of the ghost in the machine,’ I discuss my ethnomethodological and conversation analytic approach to the assembly of cognitive objects. It is important to reverse the usual social psychological metalanguage of mind causing behavior, and see how practices in interaction operate to display cognitive states of participants. Two examples are given: one in regard to the assembly of gestalts, including social actions in talk, and the other concerning the production of responses as accountable phenomena in the survey interview. While advances are being made in brain imaging, the connections between the neurobiology of the mind and the practices embedded in human conduct are tenuous at best. For the social scientist, approaching cognition through practices puts ghosts and other ephemera in abeyance and allows for analysis of the detail exhibited in behavior when minds are purportedly at work. | ||
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Latest revision as of 08:56, 13 November 2019
| Maynard2006b | |
|---|---|
| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Maynard2006b |
| Author(s) | Douglas W. Maynard |
| Title | Cognition on the ground |
| Editor(s) | |
| Tag(s) | EMCA, Cognition, Conversation Analysis, Embodiment, Gestalts, Ethnomethodology |
| Publisher | |
| Year | 2006 |
| Language | English |
| City | |
| Month | |
| Journal | Discourse Studies |
| Volume | 8 |
| Number | 1 |
| Pages | 105–115 |
| URL | Link |
| DOI | 10.1177/1461445606059560 |
| ISBN | |
| Organization | |
| Institution | |
| School | |
| Type | |
| Edition | |
| Series | |
| Howpublished | |
| Book title | |
| Chapter | |
Abstract
Suggesting that much of social science is still wedded to the ‘dogma of the ghost in the machine,’ I discuss my ethnomethodological and conversation analytic approach to the assembly of cognitive objects. It is important to reverse the usual social psychological metalanguage of mind causing behavior, and see how practices in interaction operate to display cognitive states of participants. Two examples are given: one in regard to the assembly of gestalts, including social actions in talk, and the other concerning the production of responses as accountable phenomena in the survey interview. While advances are being made in brain imaging, the connections between the neurobiology of the mind and the practices embedded in human conduct are tenuous at best. For the social scientist, approaching cognition through practices puts ghosts and other ephemera in abeyance and allows for analysis of the detail exhibited in behavior when minds are purportedly at work.
Notes
