ICCA2018 panel on experience reference
|Dates||2018/07/11 - 2018/07/15|
|Address||Loughborough University, UK|
|Geolocation||52° 46' 9", -1° 13' 29"|
|Final version due|
|Tweet||CFP: ICCA 2018 panel on experience reference, DL: 5th Sept to organizers, 30th Sept abstract due|
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CFP: ICCA2018 panel on experience reference in interaction:
Experience reference in social interaction
This panel focuses on the social organization of reference to experience in interaction: how people refer to their own and others' personal experiences to accomplish social actions, and the constraints on interactional uses of one's own and others' experiences. Sacks contrasted the ways in which people make use of experience as opposed to knowledge:
...if I tell you something that you come to think is so, you are entitled to have it. And you take it that the stock of knowledge that you have is some- thing that you can get wherever you get it, and it is yours to keep. But the stock of experiences is an altogether differently constructed thing. As I say, in order to see that that is so, we can just, for example, differentiate how we deal with a piece of knowledge and how we deal with someone else's experience, and then come to see that experiences then get isolated, rather than that they are themselves as productive as are pieces of knowledge. (Sacks 1984:425)
People treat others' experiences as owned by them (Perakyla and Silverman, 1991). At the simplest level, this means that people normally defer to others' right to define the quality of their subjective experience. However, there a many occasions in social life where people need to convey their understanding of others' experiences as grounds for what they are doing. In many situations, this entails the risk of defining the other's subjective experience on their behalf, and incurring in social sanctions for doing so. Empathy is a case in point. Heritage (2011) shows that recipients of troubles-tellings are recurrently faced with the task of displaying empathy to those teJNngs; this requires them to convey that they have some grasp or understanding of t he nature of the troublesteller's experience. However, in doing so they can go t oo far, and define the troubles-teller's experience on her/his behalf, which can attract negative sanctions. Speakers have practices to deal with this dilemma such as, for instance, referring t o parallel (i.e. "similar, but departicularized") experiences.
Another example is t he case of challenging how someone feels or thinks about their own experience. Here too, speakers' problem is how to ground an action (in this case, a challenge) by displaying adequate understanding of the other's experience, whilst avoiding unwarranted claims about the nature of that experience. One solution is for speakers to comment upon their own experience in a way that conveys, only by implication, a challenge of the other's experience (Pino, 2017). These and other previous studies exemplify how the organisation of experience reference intersects, although is not reduced to, several domains of conversation analytic inquiry, including epistemics, emotion in interaction, affiliation, story-telling, assessments, and person reference. Building on previous studies, the panel aims t o explore the organisation of reference to personal experience in social interaction; actions that speakers convey by mentioning their experiences, as well as actions that embed references to one's own or others' experiences as part of their internal machinery; and the constraints and affordances bearing upon reference to experience across ordinary and institutional settings.
Contact : Marco Pino: M.Pino@lboro.ac.uk for more information or to submit an abstract.